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In	the	domain	of	intellectual	property	rights	(IPR),	a	clear	distinction	was	initially	made	between	copyrights	cover-
ing	artistic	activities,	and	patents	covering	industrial	activi-
ties.	However,	nowadays	the	boundary	tends	to	be	blurred5.	
This	can	be	explained,	inter	alia,	by	the	emergence	of	the	
creative industries	as	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	growth	in	
the	knowledge	based	economy.	Creative	industries	(DCMS	
2001,	p.	04)	typically	include	industries	that	focus	on:	cre-
ating	 and	 exploiting	 intellectual	 property	 products	 such	
as	music,	 books,	 film	 and	 games;	 or	 providing	 business-
to-business	creative	 services	 including	advertising,	public	
relations	and	direct	marketing6.	To	a	large	extent,	these	cre-
ative	industries	integrate	artistic	as	well	as	industrial	dimen-
sions,	 thus	narrowing	 the	gap	between	 the	use	of	patents	
and	copyrights.
However,	 if	 the	 boundary	 between	 the	 main	 tools	 of	
property	right	is	now	blurred,	our	aim	in	this	contribution	is	
to	show	that	the	modes of formation and usage	of	IPR	still	
differ	 between	 creative	 industries	 and	 the	 two	 archetypal	
visions	that	are	often	associated	to	“traditional	industries”	
and	“arts”.	Our	view	is	that,	when	compared	with	the	analy-
sis	of	the	formation	and	use	of	IPR	in	those	two	archetypes,	
résumé
La	propriété	intellectuelle	(PI)	joue	un	rôle	
stratégique	 dans	 les	 industries	 créatives	
où	 la	 créativité	 est	 un	 processus	 collectif	
impliquant	 des	 acteurs	 aux	 intérêts	 con-
tradictoires,	 conduisant	 à	 un	 “dilemne	 de	
la	 PI”.	Les	 firmes	 veulent	 s’approprier	 le	
travail	 créatif	 et	 lutter	 contre	 l’imitation;	
les	 communautés	 créatives	 souhaitent	
un	 régime	 de	 PI	 souple	 pour	 recombiner	
les	 créations	 passées	 et	 générer	 des	 nou-
veautés;	 les	 individus	sont	entre	ces	deux	
extrêmes.	 Des	 arrangements	 spécifiques	
sont	 alors	 développés	 (comme	 des	 pra-
tiques	d’open	source	ou	de	creative	com-
mons)	 pour	 concilier	 appropriation	 et	
création.	 Les	 industries	 de	 la	 musique	 et	
des	jeux	vidéo	illustrent	ces	phénomènes.
Mots	clés	:	créativité,	propriété	 intellectu-
elle,	communautés,	jeux	vidéo,	industrie	de	
la	musique,	industries	créatives
abstract
Intellectual	 property	 rights	 (IPR)	 play	 a	
strategic	 role	 in	 creative	 industries.	 Defi-
ned	 as	 a	 collective	 process,	 creativity	
involves	 actors	 with	 contradictory	 IPR	
needs.	 This	 leads	 to	 an	 “IPR	 dilemna”.	
Firms	are	looking	into	appropriating	crea-
tive	work	 and	 prevent	 imitation;	whereas	
creative	communities	need	a	weak	IPR	to	
combine	 past	work	 and	 generate	 novelty.	
It	 becomes	problematic	 for	 individuals	 to	
find	 themselves	 between	 these	 two.	 As	
a	 result,	 actors	 are	 developing	 specific	
IPR	 arrangements	 (e.g.	 open	 source	 and	
creative	 commons	 practices)	 to	 preserve	
the	 balance	 between	 appropriation	 and	
openness	 allowing	creation.	Two	creative	
industries	 are	 used	 as	 illustrations:	music	
and	video-games.
Keywords:	creativity,	intellectual	property	
rights,	 communities,	 videogames,	 music	
industry,	creative	industries
resumen
Los	 derechos	 propiedad	 intelectual	 (DPI)	
juegan	un	rol	estratégico	en	las	 industrias	
creativas	 definidas	 por	 un	 proceso	 colec-
tivo	que	involucra	diferentes	actores	cuyos	
intereses	 en	 los	 DPI	 son	 contradictorios.	
Mientras	 las	 firmas	 buscan	 apropiarse	 su	
trabajo	creativo	y	prevenir	la	imitación,	las	
comunidades	creativas	necesitan	DPI	débi-
les	 para	 poder	 combinar	 trabajos	 pasados	
y	generar	novedades.	Por	 lo	 tanto	actores	
encuentran	 dificultades	 para	 identificarse	
con	una	de	estas	categorías.	En	consecuen-
cia,	estos	desarrollan	acuerdos	específicos	
de	DPI	para	preservar	un	 equilibrio	 entre	
apropiación	 y	 apertura	 que	 les	 permita	
crear.	Dos	 industrias	creativas	 ilustran	un	
ejemplo:	la	música	y	los	video	juegos.
Palabras	 claves:	 creatividad,	 derechos	 de	
propiedad	 intelectual,	 comunidades,	 vide-
ojuegos,	industria	de	la	música,	industrias	
creativas
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5.	 As	Foray	(2004,	p.	131)	wrote:	“surprisingly,	these	two	categories	
have	moved	closer	together.	Initially	they	were	far	apart,	[…]	the	boun-
dary	was	then	somewhere	between	the	beautiful	and	the	useful.	But	with	
the	development	of	scientific	and	technical	knowledge,	these	different	
rights	 now	 serve	 the	 same	purpose.	This	merger	 is	 due	 essentially	 to	
the	 fact	 that	 copyright	 has	 conquered	 new	 ground.	 By	 becoming	 the	
right	most	frequently	used	by	the	information	technology,	culture	and	
multimedia	industries,	copyright	has	“entered	the	corporate	world”.
6.	 The	 current	 DCMS	 definition	 recognizes	 eleven	 creative sectors:	
Advertising;	 Architecture;	 Arts	 and	 antique	 markets;	 Crafts	 Design;	
Communication	design;	Designer	Fashion;	Film,	video	and	photogra-
phy;	Software,	computer	games	and	electronic	publishing;	Music	and	
the	visual	and	performing	arts;	Publishing;	Television	and	radio.
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the	 formation	and	use	of	 IPR	 in	creative	highlights	 some	
very	specific	traits.
In	 traditional	 industries,	 the	 economic	 theoretical	
approach	 focuses	 on	 the	 determination	 of	 property	 rights	
as	a	means	of	protecting	innovative	efforts	in	a	given	firm	
(Arrow,	1962).	The	 fact	 that	many	 individuals	within	 the	
firm	 have	 participated	 in	 the	 innovative	 process	 does	 not	
really	matter	 since	 they	are	 supposed	 to	be	employees	of	
the	firm:	the	firm	is	analysed	as	a	representative	agent	that	
will	claim	the	property	right	in	its	entirety.	Rewarding	the	
individuals	within	the	firm	who	contributed	the	most	to	the	
innovative	process	 is	a	distinct	and	different	 issue,	which	
is	generally	treated	through	incentive	mechanisms	such	as	
prizes,	 stock	 options	 or	 other	 financial	 and	 non	 financial	
rewards.	A	second	characteristic	of	the	traditional	approach	
is	that	the	analysis	focuses	on	the	sole	universe	of	applied	
research	 (within	 a	 given	 firm).	What	 happened	 “before”,	
that	 is	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 ideas,	 is	 the	 concern	 of	 a	
related	but	distinct	universe:	the	world	of	open science.	The	
latter	is	governed	by	different	reward	mechanisms	such	as	
publication,	 peer	 recognition,	 etc.	 (Dasgupta	 and	 David,	
1994;	Stephan,	1996).	Of	course,	the	interactions	between	
the	 two	 universes,	 the	 domain	 of	 open	 science	 and	 the	
one	of	applied	 research,	are	complex	and	have	warranted	
an	 intense	 in-depth	analysis	by	economists	 (Foray;	2004;	
David,	 2006;	 etc.).	 However,	 whatever	 the	 analysis,	 one	
must	emphasise	that	the	related	universes	are	clearly	regu-
lated	with	well	identified	and	specific	institutions.
Similarly,	in	a	traditional	vision	of	arts	(cultural	indus-
tries),	property	rights	are	thought	of	as	a	means	of	reward	
and	protection	of	The Artist,	basically	again	a	given	 indi-
vidual.	The	creative	process	 is	 then	seen	as	an	 individual	
process,	which	can	possibly	be	influenced	by	various	envi-
ronmental	factors.	What	happens	before	the	appearance	of	a	
piece	of	art	is	a	matter	of	psychological,	historical,	or	social	
features	of	the	artist.
In	creative	industries,	the	process	of	creation	is	gener-
ally	a	collective	effort	that	necessitates	the	interaction	and	
coordination	 of	 a	 multitude	 of	 heterogeneous	 economic	
actors.	For	instance,	the	production	of	a	videogame	requires	
the	participation	of	hundreds,	sometimes	thousands	of	dif-
ferent	 contributors:	 artists,	 musicians,	 game	 designers,	
etc.7.	Basically,	we	argue	that	stakeholders	of	the	creative	
process	are	creative	communities,	talented	individuals	and	
firms.	Hence,	while	in	traditional	industries	and	in	arts	the	
determination	of	IPR	is	viewed	through	a	focused	angle,	in	
creative	industries	it	has	to	be	examined	as	a	fundamentally	
dispersed	phenomenon.
A	second	characteristic	of	 the	analysis	of	 IPR	 in	cre-
ative	industries	is	that	the	creative	firms	are	not	backed	by	
a	 regulated	 and	 institutionalized	universe	which	 could	be	
compared	to	the	open science,	nor	is	it	the	result	of	a	single	
individual	process.	Creative	ideas	emerge	and	develop	in	an	
informal	 universe,	 that	 is	 sometimes	 called	underground,	
but,	 contrary	 to	 the	world	of	 science,	 this	universe	 is	not	
organized	 and	 institutionalized	 with	 specific	 norms	 and	
rules.	We	argue	in	this	contribution	that	the	key	mechanism	
that	 channels	 the	 creative	 ideas	 emitted	 by	 talented	 indi-
viduals	in	the	underground	to	bring	them	progressively	to	
market	is	played	by	informal	collectives	or	creative commu-
nities.	The	role	played	by	these	communities	in	the	creative	
process	 is	essential:	 they	achieve	the	progressive	building	
of	a	common	base	of	knowledge,	a	model	and	a	“grammar”	
(a	 ”codebook”,	 according	 to	 Cowan	 et	 al.,	 2000),	 allow-
ing	the	creative	idea	to	be	equipped	with	sufficient	shared	
understanding	and	codes	to	become	economically	viable8.
The	 emergence	 of	 creative	 industries	 thus	 raises	 new	
questions,	and	 two	paradoxes	are	notably	at	stake.	A	first	
one,	analyzed	by	Cohendet	and	Simon	(2007),	puts	forward	
the	 issue	of	 the	compatibility	between	traditional	 rules	of	
corporate	governance	and	creative	communities.	 In	 short,	
is	 it	 possible	 to	 manage	 and	 drive	 creative	 communities	
without	sterilising	them?	As	emphasised	by	Cohendet	and	
Simon	 (2007,	 p.	 588):	management	 in	 creative	 industries	
“is	the	result	of	a	delicate	balance.	On	the	one	side,	there	
is	 an	 artistic	 mode	 relying	 on	 flexible	 and	 decentralised	
expertise	held	by	distinct	creative	communities	of	special-
ists;	on	the	other	side,	is	a	strict	managerial	attitude	look-
ing	for	the	advantages	of	tight	integration	of	these	activities	
within	time,	cost	and	market	constraints.	The	need	to	fine	
tune	the	level	of	integration	in	such	an	industry	is	high:	too	
strong	an	integration	could	lead	to	permanent	reduction	in	
diversity	and	creativity;	too	loose	an	integration	could	lead	
to	divergence,	chaos	and	inefficiencies”.
This	paper	deals	with	a	 second	paradox:	how	can	we	
reconcile	 the	 different	 wants	 and	 needs	 of	 three	 basic	
stakeholders	 (firms,	 individuals,	 and	 creative	 communi-
ties),	which	are	equally	important	in	the	dynamics	of	cre-
ative	 industries	 and	 which	 have	 contradictory	 interests.	
Basically,	we	argue	that	individuals	desire	strong	individual	
IPR,	firms	aim	at	strong	“corporate”	IPR,	whereas	creative	
communities	require	weak	IPR,	or	even	not	IPR	at	all,	 in	
7.	 Of	course,	in	the	domains	of	film	making	as	well	as	in	the	domain	of	
videogames	or	music	performance,	some	large	(major)	companies	have	
emerged	 and	 tend	 to	 concentrate	 (as	 in	 traditional	 industries)	 all	 the	
property	rights	 related	 to	 their	creative	products.	However,	 their	posi-
tion	is	fragile:	in	particular,	the	technological	revolution	in	information	
technologies	constantly	redistributes	the	mode	of	production	of	creative	
products	 and	 reshuffles	 relationships	 between	 creative	 ideas	 and	 the	
tangible	objects	in	which	they	are	fixed	(Andersen,	2008).
8.	 One	could	argue	that	some	groups	of	artists	may	play	the	same	role	
in	the	arts,	and	that	the	creative	process	involves	complex	interactions	
between	 the	 artist	 and	 its	 environment,	 especially	 other	 individuals,	
groups	 and	 communities	of	 artists.	However,	 the	more	or	 less	 formal	
institutions	that	are	ruling	those	interactions	have	their	own	properties	
and	modes	of	regulations,	but	are	not	directly	concerned	by	IPR	issues,	
rather	 by	 personal	 conflicts,	 jealousy,	 temporary	 cooperation,	mutual	
influence,	 etc.	 In	 addition,	 in	 creative	 industries,	 these	 creative	 com-
munities	keep	on	playing	a	role	all	 through	the	processes	of	creation,	
exploitation,	 recombination	 or	 renewal	 of	 the	 creative	 ideas.	 They	
assure	a	constant	interplay	between	the	underground	and	the	market.
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order	to	easily	use	and	recombine	existing	art,	which	is	the	
raw	material	of	the	activity	of	creation.	These	different	log-
ics	that	drive	individuals,	firms	and	communities	are	what	
we	call	the	“IPR	dilemma”	in	creative	industries.	Hence,	we	
explore	how	actors	of	the	creative	process	in	such	industries	
manage	to	implement	specific	arrangements	in	order	to	deal	
with	this	paradox	between	creation	and	appropriation.
To	illustrate	our	point,	the	present	contribution	relies	on	
two	well-known	examples	of	creative	industries:	music	and	
video	games.	These	two	industries	present	similarities,	but	
also	 some	 significant	 divergences.	 Originally,	 music	 was	
closer	 to	art	 than	to	traditional	 industries	and,	conversely,	
video-games	closer	to	traditional	industries	than	to	arts.	Yet,	
the	rise	of	new	information	and	communication	techniques	
tends	 to	 narrow	 this	 gap.	Hence,	 in	 the	 case	 of	music,	 it	
will	 in	particular	be	argued	 that	one	of	 the	consequences	
of	 digitalisation	 is	 the	 increasing	 variety	 of	 communities	
that	participate	to	develop	a	piece	of	music	and	that	contrib-
ute	to	the	emergence	of	a	new	usage	of	IPR.	In	the	case	of	
videogames,	our	contribution	will	also	focus	on	a	growing	
tendency	in	 the	domain,	namely	community	based	video-
games,	which	induce	a	specific	distribution	of	IPR	across	
the	various	participants	in	the	creative	process.
The	paper	contains	four	sections.	First,	we	present	the	
collective	nature	of	the	creative	process	that	is	the	outcome	
of	the	dynamics	of	interactions	among	three	types	of	actors:	
individuals,	 firms	 and	 communities	 (section	 2).	 Then,	 in	
section	3	we	introduce	the	IPR	dilemma	in	creative	indus-
tries	and	we	explore	how	specific	usages	of	IPR	may	con-
tribute	 to	 reconcile	 the	 different	 IPR	needs	 of	 each	 actor	
involved	in	the	creation	process.	Sections	4	and	5	display	
respectively	the	examples	of	the	music	and	the	video-game	
industries.	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 these	 two	 industries	are	
not	treated	through	case	studies	stricto sensu,	but	rather	as	
illustrations	of	 the	main	 arguments	 developed	 in	 the	pre-
vious	parts.	Section	6	provides	a	short	recap	of	these	two	
examples.
The collective nature of the dynamics  
of creation between individuals, firms  
and knowing communities.
Recent	studies	have	highlighted	two	dimensions	of	creativ-
ity	which	can	be	considered	as	central	in	our	perspective.	
First,	following	Amabile	(1983;	1997),	if	we	agree	on	the	
fact	 that	 creativity	 is	 the	 production	 of	 new	 and	 relevant	
ideas,	product	or	response	that	are	novel	and	useful,	correct	
or	valuable	responses	to	the	task	at	hand	and	derived	from	
heuristic	 process,	 then	 whatever	 human	 activities,	 such	
ideas,	product	and	response,	can	range	from	radically	new	
or	entailing	only	incremental	novelty.	This	last	case	is	gen-
erally	 considered	 as	more	 frequent	 in	 creative	 industries,	
bringing	 more	 emphasis	 on	 IPR	 issues.	 It	 also	 supposes	
a	 higher	 number	 of	 potential	 contributors.	A	 second	 key	
result	from	recent	studies	stresses	 that	creativity	can	only	
emerge	 through	 interactions	 and	 exchanges	 between	 the	
individual	and	its	cultural	and	societal	environment,	as	well	
as	among	as	many	and	as	different	as	possible	social	enti-
ties	(Csikszentmihalyi,	1996;	Wolff,	1993;	Uzzi	and	Spiro,	
2005;	Cohendet	and	Simon,	2007)9.	It	is	only	through	such	
a	 complex	and	 interactive	process	 that	 existing	 ideas	 and	
materials	 can	 be	 enriched	 and	 combined	 to	 give	 birth	 to	
radically	new	trends,	styles	and	fashions.
In	 particular,	 the	 process	 of	 creation	 in	most	 creative	
industries	 should	 not	 be	 restricted	 to	 the	 sole	 role	 of	 tal-
ented	 individuals,	 or	 to	 the	 sole	 control	 of	 the	 strategic	
vision	 of	 institutions	 (such	 as	 firms	 or	 labs	 in	 standard	
industries).	On	the	one	hand,	we	consider	that	institutions	
are	 structures	 where	 contracts	 are	 signed,	 where	 people	
are	hired	or	fired,	where	broad	competences	are	managed,	
but	they	are	not	the	active	units	of	elaboration	of	this	com-
mon	 base	 indispensable	 for	 the	 development	 of	 creation.	
Firms	are	necessary	to	put	new	creations	on	the	market,	to	
organise	their	mass	production	and	distribution.	They	can	
take	 in	 charge	 the	 industrial	 steps	 that	bring	novelties	on	
the	market,	but	 they	cannot	be	the	sole	source	of	produc-
tion	of	the	creative	ideas.	To	remain	at	the	forefront	of	cre-
ation,	firms	must	rely	on	elements	that	are	located	outside	
their	frontiers.	On	the	other	hand,	we	also	consider	that	the	
activity	of	creation	should	not	be	reduced	to	the	sole	work	
of	some	rare	genius.	Although	relevant	in	some	cases,	this	
traditional	 picture	 does	 not	 reflect	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	
creative	act.	 If	 a	new	piece	of	art	very	often	comes	 from	
one	single	creator,	the	process	that	has	led	to	this	creation	
is	unambiguously	a	collective	process,	contrary	to	what	is	
often	assumed.	This	is	especially	true	in	creative	industries	
where	the	“products”	are	often	pieces	of	arts	mingled	with	
more	standardized	products	and	services,	and	are	sold	on	
mass	markets.	Creation	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 interaction	
among	heterogeneous	individuals,	and	the	richer	the	inter-
action,	the	more	fruitful	the	creative	process.	To	underline	
only	the	individual	who	is	at	the	end	of	this	chain	of	cre-
ation	is	equivalent	to	missing	the	most	important	and	inter-
esting	part	of	the	story.
These	reasons	call	for	considering	the	fundamental	col-
lective	nature	of	the	creative	process,	and	in	particular	the	
role	of	creative communities:	the	locus	of	creation	is	rooted	
within	the	diverse	informal	communities	with	which	firms	
and	 individuals	must	 somehow	maintain	 links	 in	order	 to	
keep	 introducing	 novelties.	 By	 creative	 communities,	 we	
refer	 here	 to	 informal	 groups	 of	 individuals	 who	 accept	
to	exchange	voluntarily	and	on	a	regular	basis	in	order	to	
create	knowledge	in	a	given	field.	This	can	be	assimilated	
to	 “epistemic”	 communities	 (Cowan	 et	 al.,	 2000)	 in	 the	
academic	 literature	 which	 underlines	 the	 increasing	 role	
9.	 Notably,	 some	 analysis	 based	 on	 social	 network	 approaches	 shed	
light	on	these	aspects	(Grandadam,	2008).
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of	 these	communities	 in	society.	As	 the	knowledge-based	
economy	expands,	such	communities	take	in	charge	some	
significant	parts	of	the	sunk costs	associated	with	the	pro-
cess	of	generation	or	 accumulation	of	 specialized	parcels	
of	knowledge.	These	costs	correspond	 for	 instance	 to	 the	
progressive	construction	of	languages	and	models	of	action	
(a	“grammar”)	and	interpretation	that	are	required	for	 the	
implementation	 of	 new	 knowledge.	 Usually	 these	 costs	
cannot	be	covered	 through	 the	classical	 signals	of	hierar-
chies	(or	markets).
By	 progressively	 codifying	 the	 available	 knowledge,	
these	 communities	 provide	 the	 necessary	 cognitive	 plat-
form	to	make	creative	material	economically	viable.	As	a	
result,	 these	 communities	 are	 the	 places	 for	 the	 accumu-
lation	 of	 innovative	micro-ideas,	which	may	 be	 potential	
sources	of	future	creativity.	They	are	the	main	constituents	
of	the	“underground”	from	which	creative	industries	extract	
their	innovative	efforts.	In	order	to	be	widely	diffused,	cre-
ative	ideas	must	then	rely	on	the	interaction	between	differ-
ent	communities,	as	suggested	by	the	translation/enrolment	
principle	(Callon	and	Latour,	1991).	In	fact,	each	commu-
nity	must	 draw	 the	 attention	 of	 and	 convince	 other	 com-
munities	of	the	value	of	their	creation.	This	is	not	achieved	
without	 difficulty,	 as	 talented	 individuals	 are	 not	 always	
well	understood	and	sometimes	have	a	hard	time	persuad-
ing	others	of	the	validity	of	their	activity.	This	is	the	reason	
why	 the	first	 stages	 in	 the	 creative	process	may	be	 fairly	
long	and	complicated.	However,	once	the	construction	of	a	
common	knowledge	base	is	realized	and	the	system	is	per-
colated	(Willinger	and	Zuscovitch,	1988),	the	creative	pro-
cess	accelerates.	The	novelty	can	then	become	a	potentially	
viable	economic	application	that	may	enter	the	market	for	
creative	goods.
The	main	(and	indispensable)	role	of	creative	communi-
ties	is	thus	to	codify	and	equip	creative	ideas	with	common	
norms	and	principles.	In	this	sense,	firms	rely	on	the	work	
of	 informal	 communities,	 as	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 them	 to	
allocate	the	sufficient	amount	of	time	necessary	for	creative	
material	to	blossom,	and	because	the	cost	constraint	is	often	
incompatible	with	the	constant	need	to	nourish	new	ideas	
with	 past	 experiences.	Once	 a	 codebook	 is	 implemented,	
creativity	 can	 be	 assimilated	 to	 a	 quasi-public	 good.	The	
language	 being	 perfectly	 stabilized,	 and	 the	 procedures	
being	 easily	 replicated,	market	 opportunities	 can	 become	
predictable	(Cohendet	et	al.,	2006).	The	creation	will	there-
fore	be	economically	identified.	In	this	context,	knowledge	
will	no	longer	be	tacit,	but	on	the	contrary	will	be	treated	as	
information,	as	a	pure	public	good.	Imitation	can	therefore	
easily	take	place	without	any	compensation	for	the	produc-
ers	of	the	novelty.	At	this	step,	firms	can	relay	communities	
and	undertake	the	industrialization	and	commercialization	
of	artwork.	In	such	a	“stabilized	universe”	(Callon,	1999)	
which	is	the	result	of	the	interactive	work	of	communities,	
firms	face	the	classical	need	of	being	protected	from	imita-
tion	and	may	look	for	strong	IPR.
We	thus	propose	to	interpret	the	creative	activity	as	a	col-
lective	process	in	which	various	social	forms	(the	individ-
ual,	knowledge	communities	and	organizations)	frequently	
interact	with	one	another,	each	one	of	them	complementing	
the	work	and	correcting	the	eventual	failures	of	others.	No	
single	economic	device	could	efficiently	allocate,	support,	
associate	and	renew	creative	ideas	alone.	The	power	of	the	
creative	 process	 requires	 that	 new	 ideas	 be	 continuously	
shared,	 appropriated,	 reinterpreted,	 enriched	 and	 diffused	
again	by	heterogeneous	economic	entities.	The	image	of	a	
bazaar	mode	of	creation	as	opposed	to	a	cathedral	one	as	
they	were	analysed	by	Raymond	(1999)	in	the	creation	and	
development	of	 software	appears	 to	be	highly	 relevant	 in	
the	case	of	creative	industries.
IPR dilemma in creative industries:  
IPR to exclude vs. IPR to secure openness
The	 multiplicity	 of	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 process	 of	 cre-
ation	 suggests	 that	 the	 different	 parties	 involved	 should	
be	 rewarded	 with	 a	 complex	 bundle	 of	 diverse	 IPR,	 not	
with	 a	 single	 IPR	 device.	However,	 IPR	 in	 creative	 ven-
tures	must	also	take	into	account	the	collective	dimension	
of	 the	dynamics	of	creation	that	has	just	been	exposed	as	
the	result	of	a	delicate	balance	between	firms,	individuals	
and	communities.	More	precisely	two	antagonist	forces	are	
opposed:	on	the	one	side,	all	the	arrangements	and	related	
instruments	 that	 intend	 to	protect	authors	and	creators	by	
restricting	the	access	to	their	creation,	on	the	other	side,	all	
the	arrangements	and	related	instruments	designed	to	keep	
the	artwork	open,	 to	make	it	available	to	all,	 in	particular	
to	assure	the	indispensable	functioning	of	creative	commu-
nities.	The	tensions	between	these	two	opposed	forces	are	
intense	and	tend	to	be	aggravated	by	the	evolution	of	ICT.	
The	way	to	ease	it	will	consist	in	combining	IPR	in	various	
ways	 and/or	 creating	 new	usages	 of	 existing	 ones	 and/or	
creating	new	ones.
First,	firms	need	strong	IPR	to	exclude	imitators,	pre-
vent	copying	and	therefore	secure	some	market	power.	The	
main	instruments	to	do	so	are	copyrights,	trademarks,	pat-
ents,	 trade	 secrets,	 or	 some	combination	of	 the	 above.	 In	
the	Internet	Era,	where	most	artwork	can	be	digitalized	and	
exchanged	for	almost	nothing	on	the	web,	those	IPR	are	of	
primary	 importance	 to	ensure	 remuneration	 to	actors	 that	
participated	in	the	creative	process	and	that	invested	money	
in	it.	Without	such	IPR,	consumers	could	enjoy	art	almost	
for	free,	which	may	decrease	the	production	of	new	pieces	
of	 art.	This	 link	 between	 IPR	 and	 incentives	 to	 create	 is	
nevertheless	 often	 exaggerated.	 In	many	 sectors,	 creation	
would	probably	continue	even	in	the	absence	of	strong	pro-
tection.	But	this	does	not	affect	 the	fact	 that	actors	of	the	
creative	process	deserve	to	be	remunerated	and	that	IPR	are	
part	of	the	instruments	that	help	to	do	so.
Yet,	 if	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 firms	 need	 to	 rely	 on	 strong	
IPR,	on	the	other	hand	they	also	need	to	extract	the	creative	
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potential	of	the	creators.	And,	a priori,	these	firms	can	use	
a	classical	mechanism	to	harness	the	rights	of	creators:	the	
“work	for	hire”	contracts.	Indeed,	if	under	traditional	prin-
ciples	of	intellectual	property	law,	the	creator	of	a	“work”	
owns	 copyrights	 associated	 with	 that	 work,	 in	 case	 that	
work	was	done	while	being	paid	as	an	employee	or	under	a	
“work	for	hire	contract”,	the	creative	idea	is	owned	by	the	
employer	 instead10.	However	 a	 systematic	 abuse	 of	work	
for	hire	contracts	can	lead	to	a	risk	of	erosion	of	creativity.
Indeed,	communities	can	only	flourish	under	weak	IPR.	
Creative	 projects	 entail	 integrating,	 cutting	 and	 pasting,	
assembling	creative	elements	dispersed	among	a	vast	array	
of	 technical	 and	 cultural	 activities	 carried	 out	 by	 diverse	
and	distinct	actors.	Thus,	in	order	to	foster	the	production	
of	 novelty,	 firms,	 individuals	 and	 communities	must	 rely	
on	some	kind	of	open	spaces.	In	particular,	it	is	important	
for	firms	to	moderate	their	use	of	exclusive	IPR	in	order	to	
preserve	privileged	links	with	creative	communities,	whose	
role	was	 explained	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 Firms	 need	 a	
certain	form	of	openness	in	order	to	get	access	to	and	to	be	
in	a	position	to	mobilise,	in	a	coherent	supply	system,	the	
pool	of	competences	and	ideas	developed	by	informal	com-
munities	(Koenig,	2004).	It	is	not	always	in	the	interest	of	
the	firm	to	own	these	resources	or	to	exert	too	strict	a	con-
trol	on	them.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	cinema,	a	movie	
company	 can	 no	 longer	 employ	 all	 the	 individual	 talents	
(artists,	 designers,	 musicians,	 composers,	 etc.)	 it	 needs.	
Even	 if	 it	 could	 afford	doing	 so,	 this	would	not	be	 in	 its	
best	interest,	since	it	would	oblige	them	pay	for	these	art-
ists	and	other	creative	people	to	cultivate	and	enhance	their	
creative	potential	within	their	communities	of	origin,	rather	
than	within	the	walls	of	a	large	company11.
This	open	space	can	sometimes	be	secured	by	the	slight	
adaptation	of	standard	IPR.	Typically,	as	for	patents,	length	
and	coverage	of	copyright	can	be	modified,	copyright	may	
be	divided,	or	copyright	can	be	distinguished	from	moral	
rights.	At	the	other	extreme,	the	very	absence	of	property	
can	be	seen	a priori	as	a	solution	securing	free	access.	The	
hypothesis	here	 is	 that	both	 solutions	are	not	always	via-
ble	 in	 the	creative	 industries,	 and	 that	other	 solutions	are	
currently	 being	 developed.	The	 importance	 of	 preserving	
openness	in	the	cultural	world	was	recently	emphasized	by	
Lawrence	Lessig	in	two	books	“The	future	of	ideas”	(2001)	
and	 “Free	 culture”	 (2004)	 in	which	 he	 explains	 that	 cre-
ativity	can	hardly	occur	in	a	world	of	permission,	and	that	
the	production	of	novelty	requires	the	preservation	of	a	free	
platform	 on	which	 creators	 can	 freely	 draw	 to	 feed	 their	
creativity:
“A free culture supports and protects creators and inno-
vators. It does this directly by granting intellectual prop-
erty rights. But it does so indirectly by limiting the reach 
of those rights, to guarantee that follow-on creators and 
innovators remain as free as possible from the control of 
the past. A free culture is not a culture without property, 
just as a free market is not a market in which everything is 
free. The opposite of a free culture is a permission culture, 
a culture in which creators get to create only with the per-
mission of the powerful, or of the creators from the past” 
(Lessig, 2004, p. xiv).
A	minimum	of	openness	(and	not	an	absence	of	prop-
erty)	 is	 thus	necessary	 to	foster	 the	emergence	of	novelty	
and	 to	 enable	 creative	 communities	 to	 work	 properly.	
Openness	is	fundamental,	for	instance,	in	cases	where	the	
ownership	is	complex	and	cannot	be	attributed	to	one	or	a	
limited	 number	 of	 individuals.	 In	 these	 cases	 strong	 IPR	
surely	lead	to	conflicts,	thus	reducing	trust	and	exchanges.	
It	is	also	central	in	cases	where	the	creative	process	is	highly	
cumulative,	when	artists	are	producing	new	things	by	mix-
ing	and	combining	existing	pieces	of	art.	In	such	cases,	it	is	
usually	not	feasible	for	new	creators	to	ask	for	the	permis-
sion	of	all	the	creators	of	the	past.	And	when	it	is	possible,	it	
is	obviously	so	expensive	that	it	deters	creators	from	under-
taking	artworks.	It	is	thus	likely	that	an	open	or	free	mode	
of	creation	performs	better	than	a	permission	mode,	where	
IPR	would	be	devoted	solely	to	exclusive	purposes.
The	 solutions	 that	 are	 proposed	 to	 generate	 a	 mini-
mum	of	openness	are	best	 illustrated	by	 the	pioneer	case	
of	 the	 software	 industry.	 In	 reaction	 to	 a	 surge	 of	 appro-
priation	 through	 copyrights	 and	 patents	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
70s,	communities	of	developers	founded	the	free	software	
or	 open	 source	 software	 movement	 (Lessig,	 2001;	 Dalle	
and	Jullien,	2003;	Lerner	and	Tirole,	2001).	The	purpose	of	
these	communities	was	to	preserve	the	freedom	to	software	
source	 code,	 so	 that	 everybody	 could	 access	 this	 source	
code	and	modify	and	improve	software	without	having	to	
ask	for	permission	from	an	“owner”.	To	preserve	the	open-
ness	 of	 source	 code	 was	 considered	 as	 highly	 important	
since	it	was	a	necessary	condition	to	favour	collaborations	
and	interactions	among	software	developers.	An	important	
lesson	that	can	be	learnt	from	the	software	story	is	thus	the	
opposition	among	communities	of	developers,	who	require	
software	to	be	free	in	order	to	continuously	build	on	them,	
and	corporations,	such	as	Microsoft	or	Apple,	that	rely	on	
strong	IPR	in	order	to	protect	their	software.
10.	The	nomenclature	«work	for	hire»	refers	 to	the	principles	 through	
which	IPR	transfer	within	a	corporate	enterprise	or	between	a	purchaser	
and	 contractor.	The	US	Copyright	Act	 defines	 «work	made	 for	 hire»	
as	«(1)	a	work	prepared	by	an	employee	within	the	scope	of	his	or	her	
employment;	or	(2)	a	work	specially	ordered	or	commissioned	for	use	
as	a	part	of	a	creative	work».
11.	However,	in	some	period	of	time	the	access	has	been	more	feasible	
through	 integration,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 20s	 to	 the	 40s	 with	 the	 example	
of	 large	 studies	 such	 as	MGM	or	Columbia	 (Malone	 and	Laubacher,	
1998).	But	disintegration	was	then	provoked	by	the	rising	willingness	
of	 some	categories	of	 creators	 (in	particular	 directors,	 actors,	 authors	
and	scriptwriters)	to	have	more	control,	either	on	their	IPR,	or	on	their	
possibility	to	express	their	creativity	for	different	projects	not	necessa-
rily	for	a	unique	company.	The	balance	was	too	much	desequilibrated	
in	favor	of	appropriation	and	for	the	sole	benefit	of	the	firms.
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Ironically,	if	overly	exclusive	IPR	can	run	against	open-
ness	and	creative	communities,	they	can	also	sustain	them	
when	used	in	a	specific	manner.	IPR	can	indeed	be	powerful	
devices	to	appropriate	a	creation	and	exclude	imitators	but,	
on	the	other	hand,	they	can	also	be	used	in	such	a	way	as	
to	preserve	the	open	access	to	a	piece	of	art,	i.e.	to	prevent	
its	appropriation.	It	can	be	done	by	using	IPR	in	a	specific	
way,	in	a	copyleft	style.	This	possibility	has	the	advantage	
of	 controlling	 the	 use	 of	 the	 released	work	 and	 therefore	
of	ensuring	the	freedom	not	only	of	the	piece	of	art	itself	
but	of	all	its	improvements,	variants,	etc.	By	doing	a	“legal	
jujitsu”	(Benkler,	2006),	authors	can	use	copyrights	or	pat-
ents	to	ensure	that	nobody	can	appropriate	their	work	and	
its	subsequent	modifications	(Pénin	and	Wack,	2008).	This	
original	use	of	IPR	finds	its	roots	in	the	software	industry	
again	where,	as	we	have	seen	above,	communities	of	devel-
opers	rapidly	understood	the	need	to	preserve	openness.
It	is	important	to	stress	here	that	openness	and	free	cul-
ture	do	not	always	prevent	creators	from	making	important	
benefits.	First,	it	must	be	noted	that	technically,	a	piece	of	
art	 “protected”	 by	 a	 copyleft	 is	 not	 automatically	 free.	 It	
can	be	sold.	Yet,	the	copyleft	means	that	nobody	can	pre-
vent	someone	from	distributing	it	for	free,	which	seriously	
undermines	 the	 incentives	 to	 sell	 it.	 In	practice	 therefore,	
copylefted	 pieces	 of	 art	 are	 usually	 distributed	 for	 free.	
Second,	creators	by	copylefting	their	creation	do	not	usu-
ally	abandon	all	their	rights	over	it.	Very	often	they	keep	at	
least	their	name	associated	to	their	creation.	It	is	the	case,	
for	 instance,	 under	 the	 label	 of	creative commons,	which	
proposes	some	more	or	less	permissive	licences,	but	under	
which	it	is	always	very	important	to	mention	the	name	of	the	
creator.	Third,	new	business	models	can	be	designed	around	
free	and	open	pieces	of	art.	It	is	possible	for	artists	not	to	
sell	directly	their	copylefted	work	but	to	make	money	out	of	
complementary	services,	for	instance.	Keeping	a	resource	
free	has	been	shown	to	be	a	coherent	strategy	when	one	can	
earn	money	from	complementary	assets	(Teece,	2002).
To	summarize,	we	have	discussed	here	the	IPR	dilemma	
in	 creative	 industries.	How	can	firms	 deal	with	 their	 two	
apparent	opposite	needs:	the	need	of	creative	communities,	
on	the	one	hand,	in	order	to	raise	radical	new	concepts,	and	
the	need	of	strong	IPR,	on	the	other	hand,	in	order	to	protect	
their	market.	Communities	of	creators	can	only	evolve	 in	
an	open	world	with	weak	or	no	IPR	at	all,	in	order	to	easily	
use	and	recombine	existing	art,	which	is	 the	raw	material	
of	the	activity	of	creation.	But	this	creative	requirement	is	
permanently	facing	a	contradictory	force:	the	massification	
of	creative	industries,	the	distribution	of	art	on	a	world	wide	
scale	 relies	on	firms	 that	need	strong	 IPR	 to	protect	 their	
products.
Building	 an	 ongoing	 creative	 dynamics	 requires	 the	
preservation	of	this	fragile	equilibrium	between	exclusion	
and	openness,	which	ensures	the	co-evolution	of	individu-
als,	firms	and	a	creative	underground.	In	 this	sense,	firms	
must	accept	to	some	extent	this	new	use	of	IPR,	in	particu-
lar	 those	based	on	 copyleft	 strategies,	 creative	 commons,	
etc.	In	the	next	two	sections	we	present	the	two	examples	
of	the	music	industry	and	of	the	video-game	industry.	With	
those	two	examples	of	industries	exhibiting	quite	different	
features12,	we	aim	at	illustrating	how	the	actors	of	the	cre-
ative	process	might	develop	specific	arrangements	in	order	
to	preserve	this	delicate	balance	between	appropriation	and	
creation.
The case of the music industry13
The	music	 industry	 includes	many	actors	playing	various	
roles	 from	 the	artists	 to	 the	publisher,	producer	or	 record	
companies	(Hull,	2004;	Caves,	2002).	It	combines	individ-
uals,	firms	(typically	all	recording	companies),	institutions	
(copyright	collective	organizations,	music	training	schools,	
unions…),	and	communities	that	frequently	go	beyond	the	
boundaries	of	the	firms	and	of	the	networks	of	actors	linked	
by	contracts.	Artists	are	frequently	individuals	under	con-
tract	with	(but	not	employees	of)	companies	(sometimes	of	
a	“work	of	hire”	type),	whereas	producers,	managers,	A&R	
(Artists	and	Repertoire),	etc.,	also	often	set	up	very	small	
companies	or	single-person	companies,	blurring	the	bound-
ary	between	individuals	and	firms.
Among	 the	 IPR	 listed	 above,	 mainly	 copyrights	 are	
included,	 and	 sometimes	 also	 moral	 rights,	 allowing	 its	
owner	 to	 control	 the	 usage	 made	 of	 his/her	 music	 work	
independently	from	the	commercial	exploitation	(Andersen	
et	 al.	 2007).	Most	 of	 the	 rights	 on	music	 (to	 the	 notable	
exception	of	 the	moral	right)	can	be	“cut	 into	slices”	and	
traded,	 especially	 when	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 same	
music	work	are	 translated	under	different	 recorded	 forms	
and	 are	 exploited	 in	 different	 countries	 through	 different	
channels	of	diffusion.	The	music	industry	can	then	be	seen	
as	organized	around	the	creation,	 the	transactions	and	the	
exploitation	of	a	bundle	of	rights.
The	use	of	 the	 traditional	 copyright	 system	 is	mainly	
justified	on	the	grounds	of	the	standard	«public	good»	argu-
ment	and	its	corollaries.	Companies	are	seeking	to	use	IPR	
in	order	to	exploit	scale	effects	and	reach	the	largest	pos-
sible	market	 size	 by	 concentrating	 efforts	 on	Top	 sellers	
(“stardom	syndrome”,	see	Adler,	2005	or	Giles,	2006),	 to	
spread	risk	over	a	variety	of	artists	and	music	genres,	and	to	
maximize	the	combined	ways	of	diffusion	for	instance	by	
12.	These	are	neither	meant	to	be	detailed	and	in-depth	case	study	nor	
assumed	 to	be	 an	 exhaustive	 and	 fully	 representative	 coverage	of	 the	
overall	 creative	 industries,	 but	 rather	 overviews	 of	 two	 emblematic	
industries	highlighting	the	specific	uses	of	IPR.
13.	This	 overview	 relies	 on	 desk	 study	 and	 materials	 collected	 for	
the	purpose	of	a	communication	at	 the	Dime	Workshop	The	Creative	
Industries	 and	 Intellectual	 Property,	 Birkbeck,	University	 of	 London,	
22-23	May,	2008,	a	series	of	lectures	at	the	University	of	Strasbourg	and	
a	project	on	«	La	culture	d’innovation	en	Alsace	»	for	the	Alsace	region	
local	authorities.
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exploiting	 possibility	 of	 discrimination	 strategies	 such	 as	
bundling	(best	of,	compilations…)	or	versioning	(different	
versions	of	the	same	piece	of	music	at	different	date,	quality	
or	available	quantity).	As	in	other	sectors,	IPR	strategies	of	
firms	and	individuals	(artists	and	agents	in	the	first	place)	
also	allow	for	the	coordination	of	the	specialized	but	com-
plementary	 activities	 that	 are	 required	 to	 produce	music:	
“Here	commercial	music	value-added	is	maximized	by	put-
ting	together	joint	effort	to	create	a	joint	product	between	
the	music	authors	and	a	range	of	complementary	musical	
resources	that	are	not	freely	available	but	need	incentives”	
(Andersen	et	al.,	2007).	Transactions	on	copyrights	can	thus	
also	be	seen	as	a	way	to	share	the	risks,	through	a	multiplic-
ity	of	agreements	often	organizing	mutual	interdependence	
between	the	actors	(Connolly	and	Krueger,	2005;	Crain	and	
Tollison,	 1997).	There	 is	 a	mutual	 interest	 to	 support	 all	
the	ways	of	diffusion	and	to	secure	the	enforcement	of	all	
copyrights,	because	all	ways	of	diffusion	 frequently	 rein-
force	each	others.
How	then	can	actors	leave	some	free	“creative	space”,	
in	order	to	make	mature,	to	renew,	and	to	enrich	the	creative	
potential?	Copyright	claim	assumes	that	the	creativity	has	
materialized	 into	 a	 specific	 and	 tangible	 form	 (the	music	
work,	for	example	a	song).	Then	it	is	neither	the	idea	of	a	
song	or	of	its	components	nor	a	musical	style	that	can	be	
protected,	but	only	their	manifestation	into	a	musical	com-
position.	It	means	that	many	“creative	bricks”	that	compose	
a	music	work	or	a	 recorded	music	are	not	protected	 (for-
mal	structure,	rhythm	pattern,	guitar	solos,	string	or	brass	
arrangements,	etc.).	Artists	are	“creating	around”	by	copy-
ing	some	elements	of	the	creative	bunch	and	are	collectively	
constructing	their	reputation,	with	moral	rights	being	part	
of	an	even	more	complex	process	of	recognition	(live	per-
formance,	sessions,	newspaper	critics,	word	of	mouth…).	
The	 interplay	 with	 communities	 (musicians,	 fans,	 DJs,	
bookers,	tour	operators,	bar	and	small	club	landlords,	music	
critics,	local	authorities,	etc)	is	crucial	to	both	circulate	and	
combine	new	ideas	(Grandadam,	2008;	Brown	et	al.,	2000;	
de	Lima	e	Silva,	2004;	Lena,	2004;	Watson,	2007).	These	
communities	 take	 care	 of	 the	 coordination,	 and	 they	 are	
at	 the	 same	 time	 the	 locus	 of	 progressive	 codification	 of	
knowledge	and	creation	of	the	codebook	and	grammar	of	a	
music	style.	Key	players	are	also	the	single-person	firms	set	
up	by	independent	producers	or	managers	(creating	labels	
such	as	in	the	case	of	Jazz,	Grandadam,	2008).	They	can	be	
seen	as	a	hybrid	form	between	individuals	and	firms,	and	in	
close	contact	with	the	communities,	and	allow	for	a	mutu-
alization	of	IPRs.	However,	 they	are	attracted,	on	the	one	
side,	by	 the	exclusion	world	and	 the	 tendency	 to	become	
classical	firms	 to	 fully	exploit	a	privatization	of	 IPR,	and	
on	the	other	side,	by	the	need	to	nurture	the	open	world	to	
feed	the	creative	process.	As	the	copyright	does	not	refrain	
from	sharing	some	of	the	creative	content	of	music,	these	
exchanges	along	the	creative	process	and	the	related	“cre-
ative	slack”	can	be	maintained.
Technological	changes	largely	influence	the	effective	set	
up	and	enforcing	of	the	IPR	system,	and	the	possibility	for	
the	actors	to	use	it	strategically	(Tschmuck,	2006;	Lampel	
et	 al.,	 2008).	The	 digital	 revolution	 is	 the	most	 recent	 of	
these	 changes.	 Beyond	 the	 issue	 of	 illegal	 exchange	 of	
music	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 revenues	 of	 the	 actors	 (see	
for	instance	Andersen	and	Frenz,	2007),	mainly	due	to	the	
combination	 of	 digitalization	 with	 the	 generalization	 of	
broadband	Internet	connections	since	2002-2003,	digitali-
zation	more	broadly	 induces	a	 technological	 convergence	
between	creation,	recording	and	diffusion,	and	an	access	to	
the	technicalities	of	those	activities	for	almost	anybody	at	
low	prices.	It	has	also	allowed	or	induced	the	massive	and	
commercial	development	of	new	musical	styles	now	almost	
fully	relying	on	digital	instruments	(e.g.,	techno	or	electro	
music),	although	partly	based	on	a	quite	 long	tradition	of	
creative	activities	pre-existing	the	digitalization	rise	(see	for	
instance	the	work	of	Kraftwerk	in	the	late	60s,	or	various	
artists	in	Detroit	in	the	early	80s,	to	name	a	few	examples	
of	early	diffusion	of	those	styles	towards	a	large	audience).
Creation	seems	to	increasingly	rely	on	the	recombina-
tion	 of	 existing	 pieces	 of	music	 (e.g.,	 sampling),	 sounds	
(e.g.,	 drums	 machine	 or	 sound	 base,	 imitating	 or	 repro-
ducing	 “real”	 sounds	 or	 proposing	 completely	 artificial	
ones)	and	patterns	of	rhythms	and/or	orchestration	(loops)	
which	 is	 facilitated	by	digital	 technology	 (although	again	
they	have	been	“invented”	earlier,	for	instance	with	Pierre	
Schaeffer	 or	 Luciano	 Berio	 1950s	 works,	 original	 Rap	
from	the	early	80s	or	even	mid70s,	or	American	minimal	
music	 in	 the	 60s).	 These	 are	 creative	 bricks	 potentially	
highly	dependent	on	IPR:	sampling	because	of	copyrights,	
“sounds”	because	they	are	related	to	IPR	on	software,	loops	
potentially	 for	 both	 reasons.	This	may	 have	 some	 conse-
quences	on	 the	capacity	of	 the	IPR	system	to	 leave	room	
for	future	creation,	and	also	confers	to	the	music	creation	
another	collective	dimension	(apart	from	the	role	of	com-
munities),	putting	again	in	question	the	“romantic”	view	of	
the	individual	author	implicit	to	the	standard	copyright	sys-
tem	(Moureau	and	Sagot-Duvauroux,	2002).
One	 key	 and	 often	 understated	 consequence	 of	 digi-
talization	 is	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 communities	 and	
the	 diversification	 of	 their	 activities.	 Communities	 now	
enter	into	activities	that	were	previously	carried	out	almost	
exclusively	by	firms.	Typical	examples	are	(Beuscart,	2007	
and	Martin,	2004)	relations	between	artists	and	consumers	
(Baym,	2007),	who	often	share	the	same	“internet”	culture,	
using	Myspace,	Napster	or	 the	 similar	P2P	services,	 etc.,	
(Ebare,	 2004),	 for	 instance	 artists	 offering	 users	 the	 pos-
sibility	 to	make	 their	 own	mixes	 of	 their	 existing	music,	
communities	of	users	of	software	instruments	(Doloswala,	
2006),	internet	users	sustaining	publishing,	production	and/
or	distribution	of	new	artists	(from	simple	on-line	labels	to	
more	community-like	initiatives).	
With	 a	 potentially	 more	 massive	 diffusion	 of	 music	
directly	 by	 the	 artists,	 “social”	 rewards	 can	 be	 fully	
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dissociated	 from	monetary	 rewards	 and	 from	distribution	
by	majors	 (one	 frequently	 talks	 about	 “number	 of	 down-
loads”	rather	than	“”number	of	CDs	sold”).	The	coordina-
tion	role	could	be	partly	achieved	through	internet,	rather	
than	 by	 the	 use	 of	 various	 specialists	 (producers,	A&R,	
marketing	man…)	whose	interests	are	organized	around	the	
exploitation	of	copyrights.
The	 relations	 between	 actors	 of	 the	 creative	 process	
then	 seem	 to	 be	 drastically	 modified	 by	 digitalization.	
Correspondingly,	it	is	questionable	whether	the	copyright-
based	 IPR	 system	 can	 still	 allow	 for	 a	 balance	 between	
exclusion	 and	 openness,	 as	 it	 does	 in	 the	 “old”	 music	
industry.	 Of	 course,	 record	 companies	 try	 various	 strate-
gies	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	decreasing	 revenues	 from	CD	
sales,	presumably	not	compensated	(yet)	by	“digital	sales”	
(IFPI,	2007;	IFPI,	2008)14.	As	regards	IPR,	three	types	of	
IPR	strategies	are	presently	emerging	without	any	clearly	
dominant	model.
A	 first	 one	 is	 to	 try	 to	 «re-create»	 the	 old	 system.	
Individuals	 and	 firms	 try	 to	 restore	 excludability	 and/or	
rivalry	of	their	music,	and	then	the	basis	for	enforcing	the	
standard	 exclusion-type	 of	 IPR	 system:	 development	 of	
technical	systems	(such	as	DRM);	set	up	of	new	forms	of	
diffusion	 and	 associated	 payments	 such	 as	 subscriptions	
to	music	sites,	on-line	one	song	purchase	…;	new	types	of	
bundling	and	versioning;	increasing	attractiveness	of	“old”	
CD	for	instance	by	higher	sound	quality	than	computer	files	
or	by	adding	booklets;	creation	(by	artists)	of	unique	and	
personally	 signed	 units	 of	 “piece-of-art-like”	CD	 at	 very	
high	price;	diversification	of	channels	of	diffusion,	such	as	
phone	rings,	commercials.	There	are	also	attempts	to	repro-
duce	the	dual	system	of	majors	vs.	independent	producers	
with	the	role	of	the	latter	now	played	by	internet	social	sites	
and	related	communities.
A	 second	 strategy	 consists	 in	 diversifying	 the	 scope	
of	 the	 old	 IPR	 devices,	 for	 instance	 by	 adding	 copyright	
on	music	to	other	copyright	or	brand	names,	and	develop-
ing	derivative	products,	videogames	etc.	Part	of	this	trend	
is	the	development	of	the	live	performance	activity	which	
has	sharply	risen	in	the	last	years	and	is	now	subject	to	a	
movement	 of	 integration	 and	 transnational	 acquisition.	 It	
represents	the	major	source	of	revenues	of	many	artists,	re-
emphasizing	the	stardom	characteristics	of	the	music	indus-
try.	Here	again,	the	interests	of	individuals	and	firms	seem	
to	coincide	to	a	certain	extent.	The	so-called	360°	strategy	
developed	 by	 some	 firms	 precisely	 aims	 at	 offering	 the	
artists	to	manage	all	IPR	related	to	him/her	and	to	his/her	
music,	be	 they	 images,	music	works,	derivative	products,	
etc.
A	third	strategy	(adopted	by	a	lot	of	communities’	ini-
tiatives	evoked	above)	 is	based	on	 the	use	of	 rules	set	up	
for	a	free	and	legal	diffusion	under	the	Creative	Commons	
model.	 Different	 possibilities	 are	 offered	 to	 the	 artists	
beyond	 the	 baselines	 authorizing	 sampling,	 reproduction	
and	non	commercial	diffusion,	and	imposing	to	keep	trace	
of	 the	paternity	of	 the	music	work	(to	authorize	commer-
cial	diffusion	or	not,	 to	authorize	modifications	or	not,	 to	
have	the	possibility	of	earning	revenues	from	donation	of	
the	 internet	 users	 and/or	 for	 advertisements,	 etc.).	 In	 the	
backdrop,	 the	 objective	 is	 also	 to	 develop	 communities	
of	musicians,	 producers,	 auditors	 etc,	 by	 the	 use	 of	 vari-
ous	fora,	blogs,	tag	system,	rooms	for	critics	of	songs,	etc.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 that	 such	 an	 open	 regime	 is	
proposed	both	in	the	creation	activities	and	in	the	diffusion	
activities.
The case of the video-game industry15
A	video-game	is	a	complex	“multimedia”	artefact,	resulting	
from	 the	 expert	 integration	 of	 software-based,	 computer-
generated	animated	interactive	pictures	with	sound	effects,	
background	music,	 and	 sometimes	 voices.	 It	 is	 generally	
structured	 around	 and	 supported	 by	 a	 background	 narra-
tive,	original,	or	inspired	from	popular	culture	(comics,	car-
toons,	movies...).	
In	 fact,	 intellectual	 property	 laws	 offer	 a	 large	 array	
of	tools	to	protect	the	creative	inputs	of	a	videogame.	For	
example,	as	IDGA	(2003)	underlines:	“all	games,	 regard-
less	of	their	type,	content,	country	of	origin,	target	platform	
or	supporting	media,	comprise	some	combination	of	copy-
rights,	 trademarks,	patented	 technology	and	 trade	secrets.	
A	finished	game	often	contains	many	different	intellectual	
properties,	 owned	by	many	different	 parties.	Within	 each	
category,	some	assets	are	created	“from	scratch”	while	oth-
ers	 are	 licensed	 from	others,	whether	 for	 reasons	 of	 effi-
ciency	or	publicity”.
As	a	creative	product,	a	video-game	develops	in	stages.	
The	 earliest	 stage	 of	 game	 development,	 pre-production,	
includes	ideation,	design,	research,	prototyping,	proposal-
writing,	 and	 tool	 acquisition.	 The	middle,	 or	 production,	
stage	involves	asset	development,	feature	implementation,	
and	 integration.	 The	 final	 post-production	 stage	 requires	
testing,	 debugging,	 quality-assessment,	 balancing,	 final	
modifications,	and	all	of	the	activities	that	get	a	game	into	
the	distribution	channel:	package	design,	technical	and	user	
documentation,	release	coordination,	replication,	and	ship-
ping.	The	developer	of	the	game	as	a	legal	entity	enters	into	
numerous	business	agreements	with	employees,	suppliers,	
14.	We	will	not	address	here	the	very	debated	issue	of	the	effects	of	pira-
ting	and	illegal	exchanges	of	music	files	on	the	sales	of	music	and	on	
the	revenues	of	actors	of	the	music	industry	(see	for	instance:	Andersen	
and	Frentz,	2007;	FAD	Research,	2004;	Frost,	2007;	OECD,	2005;	Peitz	
and	Waelbroeck,	2006).
15.	This	 overview	 extensively	 relies	 on	 the	 deep	 knowledge	 of	 the	
development	around	the	Canadian-based	Ubisoft	company,	where	one	
of	the	co-authors	of	the	proposed	contribution	has	spent	three	years	for	
his	Ph.D).
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contractors,	investors,	and	publishers	over	the	course	of	this	
life	cycle.
Each	stage	requires	the	integration	of	creative	processes	
(code,	 art,	 sound,	 and	 imagination)	 with	 associated	 IPR.	
One	of	 the	main	creative	activities	of	a	videogame	 is	 the	
game design.	
Game	 design	 is	 the	 art	 and	 science	 of	 creating	 the	
game	itself:	the	ideas,	stories,	worlds,	characters,	gameplay	
mechanics	and	so	on.	In	other	words,	it	bears	the	interactive	
sets	of	rules,	and	their	evolution,	which	are	at	the	very	heart	
of	the	game	as	it	is	experienced	by	the	player:	a	challenging	
experience	which	requires	a	progressive	learning	and	mas-
tery.	However,	the	code	is	also	a	key	creative	element	of	the	
game.	For	the	gamer,	the	code	is	the	invisible	heart	of	the	
game;	for	the	developer,	it	is	the	beating	heart	of	the	busi-
ness.	Without	 the	code,	a	game	is	 little	more	than	a	great	
design	document	and	a	lot	of	individual	art	pieces.	Besides	
the	game	design	and	the	code,	there	are	a	myriad	of	other	
creative	activities	involved	in	a	game	such	as	audio,	sound	
design,	graphic	design,	etc.
The	 IPR	 agreements	 in	 the	 game	 development	 life-
cycle	will	help	 the	developer	 to	acquire	ownership	of	 the	
game	assets,	license	the	tools	and	technology	necessary	to	
make	the	game,	acquire	licensed	IPR	to	make	the	game	and	
convey	ownership	of	the	game,	or	license	the	game	to	the	
publisher	who	takes	it	to	market.	The	main	IPR	agreement	
that	a	developer	may	sign	is	that	with	its	publisher.	But	the	
developer/publisher	 relationship	 actually	 has	 several	 con-
tracts	that	comprise	IPR	agreements	associated	with	it.	The	
first	 in	 the	 process	 is	 normally	 a	mutual	Non-Disclosure	
Agreement	 (NDA)	 that	 should	 be	 executed	 by	 both	 the	
developer	and	the	publisher	prior	to	the	developer	present-
ing	its	project	to	the	publisher	for	consideration.	This	agree-
ment	determines	 the	scope	of	 the	proprietary	 information	
to	be	exchanged	and	the	responsibilities	of	each	party	with	
respect	to	not	disclosing	that	proprietary	information.
Copyright	 is	 generally	 the	main	 option	 for	 the	 devel-
oper	 to	 acquire	 ownership	 of	 creative	 inputs,	 such	 as	 in	
game	design	or	game	code	which	is	made	up	of	many	parts,	
with	 different	 authors	 and	 different	 companies	 to	 which	
those	 copyrights	 are	 assigned.	However,	 licencing	 is	 also	
a	frequent	option.	For	example,	most	console	manufactur-
ers	require	the	developer	to	sign	a	license	in	order	to	have	
access	to	the	proprietary	information	(API,	etc)	needed	to	
develop	 games	 on	 that	 platform.	 These	 licenses	 identify	
proprietary	information	(trade	secrets)	and	control	the	dis-
semination	of	such	information.
However,	 looking	at	 the	 sole	 agreements	between	 the	
game	developer	and	the	entities	(individuals	or	firms)	hold-
ing	 licences	or	claiming	copyrights,	would	be	misleading	
if	we	aim	at	understanding	the	governance	of	creativity	in	
videogames.	The	creative	activities	involved	(game	design,	
production	of	 codes,	 etc.)	 in	 a	 game	 require	 the	 continu-
ous	building	of	theories,	models,	styles,	trends,	and	which	
result	 from	 collective	 interactions	 between	 individuals	
belonging	to	creative	communities.	For	example,	Cohendet	
and	Simon	(2007)	underline	that	in	the	case	of	Ubisoft,	the	
game	designers	who	are	involved	in	different	projects	car-
ried	 out	 by	 the	 company	 remain	 connected	 to	 their	 com-
munity	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 They	 continue	 to	 exchange	 and	
interact	with	 the	other	members	of	 the	community	 (some	
members	working	within	 the	 same	firm,	but	many	others	
working	 in	 different	 institutions)	 and	 even	 tend	 to	 enrich	
the	knowledge	of	their	community	by	bringing	the	experi-
ence	gained	during	the	project	they	are	assigned	to.	In	this	
dynamic	process,	they	clearly	cope	with	a	dual	identity,	as	
members	of	a	given	project	in	the	firm	and	as	members	of	
a	given	community.	
One	 of	 the	 advantages	 of	 this	 permanent	 connection	
is	 that	 it	provides	opportunities	 for	 feedback	between	 the	
micro	creativity	that	emerges	from	the	daily	activities	dur-
ing	the	project,	and	the	macro-creativity	that	is	the	expected	
output	 of	 the	 creative	 communities.	 The	 creativity	 of	 a	
project	should	not	be	confined	 to	 the	macro-creativity	set	
up	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 project	 by	 the	 project	manag-
ers.	A	 creative	project	 should	be	 able	 to	 incorporate	 new	
ideas	and	innovative	suggestions,	and	all	the	micro-creative	
inputs	that	emerge	from	the	day	to	day	activities	during	a	
project.	This	micro-creativity	compensates	one	of	the	main	
drawbacks	of	the	hierarchical	conduct	of	any	project:	there	
is	 the	 risk	 if	 the	 hierarchy	 strictly	 controls	 the	 timing	 of	
a	project	that	this	constraint	excludes	any	significant	feed-
back	in	terms	of	conception,	and	thus	may	imply	a	loss	of	
creativity	 by	 killing	 the	 micro-creative	 inputs.	 The	 dual	
identity	mitigates	this	risk,	by	allowing	permanent	interac-
tions	between	micro	and	macro	creativity.	In	practice,	this	
permanent	interaction	may	lead	to	two	main	effects.	First,	it	
may	happen	that	if	a	micro-creative	idea	that	has	emerged	
during	a	project	appears	to	be	relevant,	it	can	quickly	cir-
culate	within	the	communities	through	regular	exchanges,	
be	improved	and	validated	through	these	exchanges,	and	be	
introduced	directly	into	the	project,	i.e.	be	enacted.	Second,	
micro-creative	 ideas	 that	 emerge	 during	 a	 project	 can	 be	
absorbed	in	the	active	memory	of	some	creative	communi-
ties,	as	a	creative slack	that	could	be	used	in	other	projects.
The	key	 role	of	 creative	 communities	 in	 the	develop-
ment	 of	 videogames	 has	 a	 consequence	 in	 terms	 of	 IPR.	
Creative	 communities	 will	 claim	 weak	 IPR	 devices	 to	
maintain	 their	 collective	 endeavour	 of	 building	 the	 quasi	
public	goods	that	offer	codebooks	and	grammars	of	usage	
to	 the	 creative	 activities.	The	 spectacular	 development	 of	
open	 source	 based	 videogames,	 copyleft	 systems,	 or	 cre-
ative	commons	in	the	domain,	offers	clear	evidences	of	the	
presence	 and	 claims	 of	 creative	 communities.	 There	 are	
myriads	of	examples	supporting	this	fact.	 In	many	games	
the	game	source	code	 is	 released	as	public	domain	along	
with	 the	 shareware-released	media	files,	 in	Adventure	 the	
original	text	adventure	game,	source	code	is	public	domain;	
Wesnoth	 is	an	open-source	strategy	game,	FreeDoom	 is	a	
set	of	open	source	graphics	files	for	open	source	versions	of	
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the	Doom	engine,	GNU Go	is	a	free	program	that	plays	the	
game	of	Go,	Rocks’n’Diamonds	 is	an	open-source,	cross-
platform,	 arcade	 game	 that	 contains	 clones	 of	 Boulder 
Dash, Emerald Mine, Supaplex and Sokoban. Ur-Quan 
Masters	 is	 the	 classic	 Star Control 2	 game,	 re-released	
under	the	GPL	license,	etc.	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 exploitation	modes	 of	 intellec-
tual	 property	 rights	 are	 typical	 of	 the	 cultural	 industries	
and	aims	at	ensuring	returns	either	to	the	firms	or	the	indi-
viduals	through	appropriation	via	negotiated	contracts.	The	
licensing	business,	translating	IP	from	the	movies,	media,	
or	 sport	 business	 seems	 to	 be	 closer	 to	 this	 exploitation	
mode,	and	is	often	criticized	as	limiting	the	creativity	of	the	
video	game	industry.
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 exploration	 is	 allowed	 through	
“lighter”,	more	open	rights	that	fuel	knowledge	circulation,	
sharing,	and	discussion	of	the	ideas	among	communities	of	
developers.	Traditionally,	 these	 communities	would	 inter-
act	through	face-to-face	relationships	in	personal	networks,	
often	on	university	campuses	or	even	in	video-game	firms,	
or	online	through	virtual	forums.	Developers	and	wannabe	
developers	would	share	knowledge	and	early	prototypes	of	
games	in	a	rather	informal	way.	In	general,	a	programmer	
would	act	as	a	designer	for	his	own	project,	but	would	also	
look	for	graphic	and	sound	artists	 to	enhance	his	project.	
The	 developer	 would	 disclose	 early	 developments	 of	 his	
work	 to	 try	 to	 attract	 new	partners	 to	work	with	 him.	At	
this	 step,	 community	 spirit	 rules,	 and	 IP	 rights	 are	 rarely	
invoked.	Two	examples	 illustrate	how	 those	 communities	
feed	the	creativity	of	the	video	game	industry.
Kongregate16
	is	an	online	platform	dedicated	to	the	diffu-
sion	of	mini,	independent,	online	games.	Its	business	model	
is	 based	 on	 pay-per-hits,	 online	 advertising:	 each	 time	 a	
page	 is	 loaded	 and	 that	 an	 ad	 is	 viewed,	 the	 firm	 adver-
tising	 its	 service	 or	 product	 is	 invoiced.	With	many	 visi-
tors	visiting	the	site	to	play	or	to	get	inspiration	from	some	
of	the	over	17	000	online	games,	the	site	is	self-sufficient.	
The	site	activities	are	backed	by	a	very	active	community	
of	developers,	interacting	through	multiple	forums.	To	sup-
port	 this	community,	Kongregate	partnered	with	Aviary17,	
a	firm	developing	a	suite	of	light	video	game	development	
tools,	and	also	a	strong	advocate	of	independent,	commu-
nity-based	 development	 as	 a	 source	 of	 inspiration	 for	 its	
products.	Thus,	the	Kongregate	community	can	freely	use	
Aviary	 tools,	with	no	license	fee,	 to	feed	its	creative	pro-
cess.	The	community	is	also	encouraged	to	showcase	and	
share	its	creations	online	to	foster	partnerships	with	other	
independent	developers18.	This	very	open	process	allows	the	
site	to	offer	very	innovative	and	inspiring	games,	constantly	
renewed	by	this	creative	pipeline.	As	a	further	step,	it	is	get-
ting	normal	practice	for	more	institutionalized	video-game	
development	firms	or	publishers	to	monitor	the	Kongregate	
site	or	its	online	equivalent,	and	sometimes	to	acquire	the	
right	for	a	game	to	include	it	in	its	development	portfolio,	
where	the	game	could	be	expanded	and/or	adapted	for	com-
mercial	release	on	PC	or	consoles.	
On	 the	 same	wavelength,	 top	publishers	 in	 the	 indus-
try	rely	more	and	more	on	the	involvement	of	independent	
creators.	Significantly,	even	the	largest	firms	in	the	industry	
tend	 to	connect	 to	 informal,	unstructured	communities	of	
creators	 and	 developers	 through	 beta-testing	 (early,	 pre-
release	testing	of	the	game,	open	to	registered	users,	selected	
on	 their	proven	 interest/expertise),	 and	also	 through	open	
competitions,	 like	 “independent	 games	 festivals”19.	As	 an	
illustration,	in	2007	Ubisoft	Montreal	launched	a	competi-
tion20	to	bring	developers	to	submit	their	concepts	and	early	
development	 to	 the	 appreciation	 of	 industry	 experts	 and	
professionals.	Such	a	competition	literally	«pulls»	creativ-
ity	from	the	underground.	Competitors	would	then	gladly	
show	 their	 projects	 but	 also	 how	 they	 developed	 them.	
Based	on	the	professional	and	experts	assessment,	the	firm	
then	decides	either	to	support	the	development	and	publish-
ing	of	some	projects	through	IP	acquisition,	or	to	hire	some	
developers,	based	on	their	ideas,	skills,	and	creativity.	
Contrary	to	what	some	experts	argue,	our	view	is	that	
the	 claim	 of	 creative	 communities	 does	 not	 threaten	 the	
industry	of	videogames.	It	is	quite	the	opposite:	the	reward	
of	weak	IPR	to	creative	communities	through	copyleft,	open	
source	or	creative	commons	is	the	guarantee	of	building	of	
the	 fertile	soil	of	creativity	which	favours	 the	 interests	of	
talented	individuals	as	well	as	active	companies	in	the	field.
Conclusion
This	contribution	is	a	first	step	of	an	ongoing	exploration	
of	the	creative	industries	and	the	role	played	by	intellectual	
property	rights	to	foster	creation.	Traditionally,	IPR	are	con-
sidered	as	 instruments	 to	protect	creators,	 to	enable	 them	
to	earn	a	remuneration	and	therefore	to	increase	incentives	
to	 create.	We	 argued	 that	 this	 view	 presents	 only	 half	 of	
the	story.	IPR	also	fulfil	an	important	role	of	coordination	
of	creative	activities.	This	latter	role	is	especially	relevant	
when	 numerous	 and	 heterogeneous	 actors	 are	 part	 of	 the	
creative	process.
We	first	 emphasised	 the	 fact	 that	 creation	 is	 a	 collec-
tive	 process	 that	 involves	 interactions	 among	 three	 main	
types	of	actors:	firms,	single	individuals	and	communities.	
Yet,	each	of	these	actors	may	need	different	and	sometimes	
contradictory	types	of	IPR.	For	instance,	firms	usually	need	
strong	 IPR	 to	 prevent	 free-riding	 and	 to	 be	 able	 to	 com-
mercialise	art.	But,	on	the	other	hand,	creative	communities	
16.	http://www.kongregate.com/
17.	http://aviary.com/
18.	http://www.kongregate.com/collabs
19.	For	instance:	http://www.igf.com/		
It	is	the	most	important	festival,	parallel	to	the	more	official,	institutio-
nalized	Games	Developers	Conference,	in	the	US.
20.	http://www.toomuchimagination.ca/
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usually	need	weak	IPR	to	be	able	to	reuse	without	control	
existing	pieces	of	art	that	is	the	raw	material	to	create	new	
things.	At	the	intersection	between	firms	and	communities	
lies	therefore	a	potential	IPR	dilemma:	firms	need	creative	
communities	to	provide	them	with	a	continuous	stream	of	
new	 creation.	But	 firms,	 and	 sometimes	 individuals,	 also	
need	strong	IPR	to	make	money	out	of	new	pieces	of	art.	
To	analyse	this	dilemma	we	selected	two	creative	industries	
with	 different	 features:	music	 and	video	games.	The	first	
one	has	been	existing	 for	more	 than	a	hundred	years,	 the	
second	one	is	far	much	younger.	The	first	one	has	evolved	
and	had	to	adapt	to	a	lot	of	technological	(as	well	as	artistic)	
revolutions	out	of	which	the	digital	rise	is	the	most	recent	
one,	 while	 the	 other	 is	 “born”	 in	 the	 digital	 age.	Video	
games	industry	has	to	manage	creative	inputs	of	very	dif-
ferent	nature	with	corresponding	IPR	arrangements,	while	
music	industry,	at	least	up	to	recently,	is	mainly	focused	on	
music	and	on	IPR	on	music	only.	Video	games	develops	in	
stage,	with	a	need	of	managing	the	IPR	dilemma	all	the	way	
long,	while	most	frequently	the	creation	of	a	piece	of	music	
is	more	limited	in	time	as	well	as	in	number	of	“go/no	go”	
decisions	and	in	number	and	variety	of	actors	involved	in	
these	decisions.
The	overview	of	 the	music	 industry	clearly	 illustrates	
the	interplay	of	the	three	types	of	actors	in	the	dynamics	of	
creation.	The	standard	IPR	system	based	on	copyright	has	
been	more	 or	 less	 able	 (even	with	 adaptation	 phases,	 for	
instance	with	the	emergence	of	radio)	 to	reconcile	appro-
priation	and	openness	for	creation,	thanks	to	the	possibility	
to	divide	 it	 in	pieces,	 to	 the	 intrinsic	 (potential	or	actual)	
distinction	between	monetary	and	social	recognition	that	it	
conveys,	and	to	its	limited	coverage	as	regards	the	“creative	
bricks”.	In	addition,	it	is	argued	that	the	pervasive	spread	of	
digital	technologies	has	changed	and	increased	the	role	of	
communities,	enriched	the	scope	of	IPR	used	to	secure	eco-
nomic	revenues	and	brought	about	changes	in	the	way	they	
are	used,	and	encouraged	the	emergence	of	new	IPR	tools.
The	 case	 of	 videogames	 illustrates	 that	 the	 tensions	
that	 exist	 between	 using	 standard	 IPR	 system	 generally	
based	on	copyright,	and	developing	“weak”	collective	IPR	
through	copyleft,	open	source	or	creative	commons.	In	this	
perspective,	our	view	is	that	the	growing	claim	of	creative	
communities	 does	 not	 threat	 the	 industry	 of	 videogames,	
but	tends	to	reinforce	its	development	through	guaranteeing	
the	conditions	of	creativity.
Both	 examples	 illustrate	 that,	 between	 the	 two	arche-
typal	models	of	“traditional	industries”	and	“art	world”	in	
which	appropriation	and	creation	are	supposed	to	be	ana-
lytically	well	separated	and	can	be	ruled	by	straightforward	
tools,	the	creative	industries	have	to	design	complex	insti-
tutional	settings	allowing	firms,	communities	and	individu-
als	 to	 interact	with	 each	 other	while	maintaining	 a	 good	
balance	between	appropriation	and	creation.	The	range	of	
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IPR	tools,	from	no	IPR	at	all	to	for	instance	“work	for	hire	
contract”	 is	 precisely	 mobilized	 for	 that	 purpose,	 with	 a	
need	of	constant	re-adjustments	for	dealing	with	this	per-
manent	tension.	IPR	in	creative	activities	can	then	contrib-
ute	to	organizing	and	regulating	a	fertile	and	informal	world	
of	“open	creativity”.	Creative	firms	have	a	deep	interest	to	
“invest	and	pay”	for	the	existence	of	the	informal	universe.	
Thus,	we	show	that	the	IPR	dilemma	in	creative	industries	
may	 lead	 to	 the	 elaboration	of	 an	original	use	of	 IPR,	 in	
particular	based	on	open	source	practices	imported	from	the	
software	industry,	and	that	allow	reconciling	to	some	extent	
the	contradictory	needs	of	the	actors	involved	in	the	dynam-
ics	of	creative	industries.	
However,	locate	the	creative	industries	in	such	interme-
diate	position,	as	showed	in	Figure	1,	does	not	mean	that	
these	modes	 of	 usage	 of	 IPR	 are	 specific	 to	 the	 creative	
industries.	For	instance,	there	are	many	examples	of	com-
panies	 using	 open	 source	 solutions	 developed	 by	 virtual	
communities,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 software	 for	 electronic	 con-
sumer	goods	(TV	decoders)	of	for	data	analysis	module	of	
a	NASA	probe	towards	Mars	(Norris	and	Kamp,	2004).	But	
as	illustrated	by	the	cases	of	music	and	video	games	indus-
tries,	the	role	played	by	communities	in	creative	industries	
make	the	search	for	these	IPR	solutions	more	central	for	the	
creativity	and	the	viability	of	the	activities.	
As	 compared	with	more	 traditional	 studies,	 this	work	
then	 places	 emphasis	 on	 underground	 creative	 communi-
ties,	 which	 play	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	 introducing	 radi-
cal	 novelty,	 new	 fashions,	 styles,	 etc.	 Increasingly,	 firms	
acknowledge	the	importance	of	these	communities	and	the	
necessity	 to	 establish	 links	with	 them.	Yet,	 since	 the	 two	
modes	of	functioning	(firms	vs.	communities)	are	radically	
different,	it	is	not	easy	to	make	these	two	worlds	co-exist.	
Creativity	needs	openness,	while	mass	distribution	requires	
a	degree	of	appropriation,	of	control.	We	find	here	the	tra-
ditional	 tradeoff	 that	 IPR	must	 help	 to	 solve.	 Putting	 the	
cursor	too	far	on	one	side	either	stops	creativity	or	prevents	
a	large	distribution	of	art.
This	contribution	strongly	suggests	that	firms,	although	
they	feel	threatened	by	underground	creative	communities,	
do	need	 them.	Moreover,	we	have	 argued	 that	 successful	
firms	in	the	future	will	be	those	who	implemented	the	best	
strategy	 to	harness	 the	 creative	potential	of	 communities.	
And	 among	 those	 strategies,	 relaxing	 some	 control	 over	
their	IP	is	likely	to	be	one	of	the	concessions.	
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